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Abstract
Given the migration premium previously identi¯ed in an impact evaluation approach, this
paper asks the question of why migration is not more prominent, given such high premium
associated with it. Using long-term household panel data drawn from rural Tanzania, Kagera
for the period 1991-2004, this study aims to answer this question by exploring the contribution
of education in the migration premium. By separating migrants into those that moved out of
original villages but remained within Kagera and those who left the region, this study ¯nds
that, in consumption, the return on investment in education is higher at both destinations.
However, whilst the higher return on education fully explains the gains associated with migra-
tion within Kagera, it only partly explains those of external migration. These ¯ndings suggest
that welfare opportunities are higher at the destination and that an individual's limited invest-
ment in education plays a major role in preventing short-distance migration from becoming a
signi¯cant source of raising welfare, which is not the case for long-distance migration. While
education plays a role, it appears that other mechanisms may prohibit rural agents from ex-
ploiting the arbitrage opportunity when they migrate to the destination at a great distance
from the source.
Keywords: Africa, Internal migration, School Investment, Return to education, Welfare growth
JEL classi¯cation: I25, J61, J62, O15, R23
1 Introduction
Whilst rural-to-urban migration has traditionally been seen as a way out of poverty for most people
living in agrarian societies in developing world, only recently economists have started providing
rigorous empirical evidence supporting the notion that migration, indeed, positively a®ects income
and consumption (McKenzie et al., 2010; Beegle et al., 2011).1 However, this signi¯cant migration
e®ect leads to the question of why not more people choose this option, if the bene¯ts are so high.
¤I thank Ian Crawford, Stefan Dercon, Christopher Heady, Seiro Ito, Tomohiro Machikita, Thomas Melonio,
Francis Teal, Kazunari Tsukada, and participants at the 3rd International Conference: Migration & Development
(Paris, 2010), the Royal Economic Society Annual Conference (Egham, 2011), and a seminar at the IDE for valuable
comments and suggestions. All errors remain my own.
yInstitute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO), 3-2-2 Wakaba, Mihama-ku, Chiba-shi, Chiba 261-8545, Japan,
Yuya Kudo@ide.go.jp, +81-43-299-9697.
1Two types of di±culties may account for this, namely collecting micro-level data tenable to a rigorous empirical
analysis (usually collected at either migrants' origin or destination), and e®ectively controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity driving migrants' self-selection (Borjas, 1987, 1994; Hartog and Winkelmann, 2003; Chiquiar and
Hanson, 2005).
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Many policy considerations highlight this question. Given the remarkably high return, for
example, supporting rural agents' migration might have a higher potential to improve their welfare
than any other development policy would (McKenzie and Gibson, 2010). In addition, many social,
economic, and political problems in an urban area (e.g., high unemployment rate, high food prices,
housing shortages, health problems driven by air pollution, and political instability) might be
associated with the substantial rural-to-urban migration (Todaro, 1969; Stark, 1982). Hence,
having a full understanding of mechanisms discouraging (or encouraging) rural agents' mobility
should provide policymakers challenging these issues with an appropriate theoretical background
to do so.
One simple reason for this puzzle is that, typically researchers provide the evidence indicating
bene¯ts of migration by taking an impact evaluation approach, which does not address the under-
lying mechanisms that bene¯t migrants. If the higher return on some capital at the destination
is the source of the migration premium, then the reasons for the limited mobility may no longer
be a mystery. The answer would simply be that those who do not possess those capital resources
would choose not to migrate. In fact, a variety of potential resources might be valued at migrants'
destination - from human capital (e.g., education, healthy body and mind), to physical capital
(e.g., business equipment, vehicles) as well as social capital (e.g., business network).
Broadly speaking, two approaches may be available to address the question of why migration
is not more prevalent, one of which is investigating what capital endowments limit or drive rural
agents' mobility in migration decision equation, as done previously (e.g., Banerjee and Kanbur,
1981; Daveri and Faini, 1999). Whilst the evidence of migrants' requirements in relation to re-
location is explicit, it fails to identify the extent to which migrants' endowments can explain the
migration premium and even whether the migration premium exists. Consequently, any interpre-
tation of data in terms of welfare gain is impossible in this approach. Alternatively, estimating
an outcome equation (income and/or consumption) might lead to new insights with respect to
factors that contribute to realization of migration premium. If the migration premium is entirely
attributed to the higher return on some capital at the destination in an outcome equation, then
it is likely that those lacking it would choose not to migrate. Whilst this approach is only sugges-
tive about factors limiting rural agents' mobility, it can directly link the return on capital to the
migration premium. Although, clearly both approaches have pros and cons, the second approach
has not been implemented in previous studies. Most likely, such work has been lacking due to
the di±culty in indentifying the migration premium. As described above, because only recently,
economists have started to provide rigorous empirical support for the positive migration e®ect, it
is not surprising that no one has ever attempted to quantify the source of migration premium. The
current study ¯lls this gap by taking the second approach with a scope of migrants' educational
attainment.
The approach and scope of this study were chosen as, ¯rstly, they allow for explicit testing of
the extent to which rural agents' capital endowments bene¯t them, likely, by encouraging their
resettlement. Identifying the key capital in this process, as well as the extent to which it explains
the migration premium enables us to predict how welfare distribution in an economy will be a®ected
by encouraging or discouraging rural agents' capital acquisition. For practitioners who intend to
manage the distribution pattern of welfare and population, this information should be highly
helpful in scoping out the most cost-e®ective policy intervention. Regarding the scope, previous
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research provided much evidence that migrants are positively selected from rural surroundings in
terms of both observed and unobserved skills (Barnum and Sabot, 1977; Lanzona, 1998; Robinson
and Tomes, 1982; McKenzie et al., 2010). Closely related to the current study, Dahl (2002)
also showed that state di®erences in the return on investment in education signi¯cantly in°uence
migration °ows of college-educated individuals in the United States. As all these ¯ndings suggest
that human capital is important for migrants' success at the destination, education should be a
natural starting point to consider.
Given the existent migration premium identi¯ed in an impact evaluation approach, the aim of
this study is to test to what extent the premium can be explained by education. It is expected that,
if the migration premium is entirely attributed to the higher return on investment in education at
the destination, less educated individuals will choose not to migrate. Using long-term household
panel data drawn from rural Tanzania, this study shows that education, indeed, plays a role in
explaining the gains from migration, indicating an interesting trade-o® between the importance of
education and the distance to the destination.
This paper uses data sourced from the Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS). The
KHDS is a ¯ve-wave long-term household panel survey conducted in the rural region in northwest
Tanzania, Kagera. The ¯rst four waves were carried out between 1991 and 1994 at 6- or 7-month
intervals, with the ¯nal wave carried out in 2004. As approximately 35% of initial respondents
moved out of their original communities during the sample periods, the data set used in this
study contains a good variation of migrants and non-migrants that will be useful in the subsequent
analysis.2 The data also allows us to investigate rural agents' long-term investment in education,
which cannot normally be observed in short-term panel surveys. In addition to the long-term and
highly resourceful data it yields, one of the most important advantages of using the KHDS as a
data source for this study is that it dispenses with the need to ¯nd an answer for the question of
whether the migration premium exists. By applying an impact evaluation approach to the KHDS
data, Beegle et al. (2011) found that moving out of original communities added 36 percentage
points to consumption growth from wave 1 to 5 on average.3 Thus, their study con¯rms the
existence of migration premium, allowing this study to focus on the question of why migration
is not more widespread, as well as on identifying the source of this consumption growth with an
emphasis of the role of education. In addition, examining the process of migration taking place
in Africa is particularly meaningful because Africa recorded the highest annual rate of growth of
urban population in the world between 1975 and 2007 (United Nations, 2008).4
This study contributes to development research, as it takes the migration premium identi¯ed in
Beegle et al. (2011) as given and extends the research into the question of why the migration of rural
agents is not more prominent. To address this question, overhauling the underlying mechanisms
and testing them one by one is necessary.5 Thus, the ¯ndings of this study should be a good
starting point for further work on this topic. In this sense, the current study also attempts to shift
2In addition, almost half the initial respondents moved out of their original households.
3Before commencing the current study, the attempt was made to replicate their ¯ndings by adopting the strategy
the authors employed, di®erences-in-di®erences OLS (DID-OLS) and DID-2SLS, to the measure of consumption
implemented here. Pooling migrants into one group, the e®ect of migration on consumption growth was estimated
to be approximately 0.34, which is insigni¯cantly di®erent from their point estimate of 0.36.
4By 2050, Africa is projected to be second to Asia as a region to accommodate a large number of urban inhabitants
(United Nations, 2008).
5For example, researchers in the ¯eld of microcredit have done so for its business model over the last decade to
explain the high rate of repayment (e.g., Bauer et al., forthcoming).
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away from a fully reduced-form approach, which solely identi¯es the gains from migration. Whilst
the paper does not intend to provide a fully structural interpretation of data, it crosses an ongoing
debate about model e®ectiveness of `structural' versus `reduced-form' by giving some consideration
to the underlying economic model that may explain the data (e.g., Todd and Wolpin, 2006; Kennan
and Walker, 2011). In addition, this research links to studies investigating the reasons behind slow
adoption of bene¯cial technology, such as high-yield crops and fertilizers, in developing world
(e.g., Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011; Suri, 2011). This paper explores the role of educational
attainment in the context of limited investment in migration. Finally, studying internal migration
is per se another signi¯cant contribution, because researchers have tended to explore international
migration despite a great number of internal migrants in the world.
This paper is organized in six sections. In Section 2, a simple rural-to-urban migration model
is presented to motivate an empirical analysis. Section 3 describes an empirical strategy, whereas
Section 4 presents an overview of data, brie°y checking whether the theoretical model ¯ts the
empirical data. The estimation results are reported in Section 5, followed by the conclusions
summarized in Section 6.
2 Conceptual Framework
In contrast to previous studies estimating migration decision equation, this study aims to answer
the question of why migration is not even more pronounced by exploring to what extent the
migration premium can be explained by education. The underlying presupposition for taking
this approach is that if the premium is entirely attributed to the higher return on investment in
education at the destination, those uneducated individuals (i.e., those who cannot a®ord the cost of
schooling as well as that associated with migration) would choose not to migrate. To formalize this
idea, this section develops a simple rural-to-urban migration model. For expositional simplicity,
the model assumes absence of any uncertainty. As discussed in Appendix A.3, however, introducing
uncertainty into the model would not seriously a®ect implications derived from the model. While
the model is static and non-stochastic, it can provide a fundamental mechanism for explaining the
relationship between migration, educational attainment, occupational choice, and earnings.
By using a similar framework, two types of mobility are delineated in the model, namely
migrating to cities to achieve higher education (and work there) (subsection 2.1), and migrating to
cities to ¯nd jobs after completing education in rural surroundings (subsection 2.2). In the model,
urban jobs reward migrants for their education (® > 0). The positive return on education gives
rural agents an incentive to migrate, encouraging the less educated to invest in further schooling
before joining the labor force, conditional on the initially endowed level of education. Depending
upon where learning opportunities are available, some individuals migrate in order to seek more
education, whilst others do so after obtaining it. The investment process of migration and schooling
is expected to eventually result in higher earnings.
The initial level of education plays a role of credit in the model and, at equilibrium, in which
the credit constraint is binding, not all agents can migrate and not all migrants can achieve the
education of their choice. The model yields three main predications at the equilibrium. Firstly,
migrants are more likely to be in the upper tail of the initial educational distribution (positive
selection into migration). Secondly, initially better-educated agents seek more education (posi-
tive selection into education). Thirdly, initially better-educated agents eventually achieve higher
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earnings. To see the goodness of ¯t of the model to empirical data, subsection 4.4 checks if these
assumptions and predictions are broadly consistent with data. The model also establishes how the
migration premium should be linked to education in an outcome equation in the subsequent em-
pirical analysis, showing the importance of allowing for the di®erence in the return on investment
in education between the origin and the destination in the empirical outcome equation.
2.1 Migration for Education
2.1.1 Environment
Consider a rural economy (origin) in which a large population (a continuum) of risk-neutral agents
with identical preferences exists. The population is characterized by a distribution function G(¹s),
which provides the measure of the population with the initial educational level at the origin less
than ¹s.6 Here, it is assumed that ¹s is distributed in the interval [0; ¹su]. Moreover, agents have the
freedom to decide whether to migrate into an urban area (destination) or not. If they prefer to stay
in the rural sector, they simply choose their occupations from those available at the source. On
the other hand, the urban economy gives them opportunities to attain a higher education before
joining the labor force. Since the model is static, it implies that the migrants simultaneously choose
the level of education s 2 R+, as well as occupations, once they migrate.
2.1.2 Occupational Choice and Educational Attainment
Gross income from occupations is de¯ned as 2®q + ±, where q 2 R+ describes occupations. It is
assumed that ® > 0 and ± > 0. The positive ® is a crucial assumption in the model, and will be
explained shortly. While only one occupation (q = 0, self-employed farming) is available in the
rural sector, heterogeneous set of jobs exists in the urban economy (q 2 R++). This speci¯cation
ensures that gross income from urban jobs increases as q increases. We might be able to interpret
a lower q as non-farm self-employed petty trading and higher q as non-farm formal wage jobs.
Alternatively, a higher q might suggest that the job pays workers more, since it is a complex task
that requires a higher level of skills or technologies. Any urban job requires agents to have the
skills (measured by education, s) that suit it. Thus, if agents do not have the skills necessary to
perform their occupations, they would lose income. This monetary cost is ®(q ¡ s)2.7 With these
assumptions, agents' labor income y can be written as
y =
8<: yr = ± if agents do not migrate,
yu = ®
£
2q ¡ (q ¡ s)2¤+ ± if agents migrate. (1)
As already mentioned in the previous subsection, migrants have opportunities to obtain a higher
education. In that case, migrants with the initial level of education ¹s have to pay the di®erence
between the cost (e.g., tuition fees) required to achieve the target level of education (s) and the cost
already incurred to obtain the current level of education (¹s). Assuming that the cost of education
is convex, we de¯ne it as ¯(s2 ¡ ¹s2), where ¯ > 0.
6In the context of wealth distribution, similar settings can be seen in Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Ghatak
and Jiang (2002).
7A similar setting can be seen in Yamauchi (2004), where skill requirement has multiple dimensions. As multi-
plying (q ¡ s)2 by ® is just for computational simplicity, the manipulation una®ects implications derived from the
model.
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For expositional simplicity, unemployment or withdrawal from the labor market is excluded
from this model. In addition, the opportunities for additional schooling are assumed to be guar-
anteed, as long as migrants seek them, and there are no school dropouts in the economy. Whilst it
is assumed that ¹s is distributed with variation in the absence of return on investment in education
in the rural sector, this may be justi¯ed for many reasons. As the complete absence is chosen in
this model mainly for simplicity's sake, it is possible to, for example, introduce a small return on
investment in education into rural jobs without seriously a®ecting implications arising from the
model. Alternatively, the initial level of schooling can be seen as basic education supplied by the
government (e.g., elementary). As some children might have di±culty in attending school for some
reason (e.g., household budget, school location), the di±culty might generate small dispersion,
even at this level of education.
2.1.3 Wealth, Cost of Migration and Credit Rationing
Each agent has his/her own wealth as endowments, which are expected to positively correlate
with the initial level of schooling. This assumption is important because it enables the initial
educational level to play the role of credit in the model. Thus, the initial level of wealth is de¯ned
as °¹s+ ½, where ° > 0 and ½ > 0. In addition, it is assumed that the ¯xed cost of migration m is
greater than ½ (½ < m), which means that the agent with no initial education (¹s = 0) is not able
to migrate unless he/she obtains a loan.
Agents can a®ord the cost of migration and additional schooling through loan contracts with
rural lenders before they migrate. However, there is the possibility that borrowers can default
on a debt, as they may avoid meeting any outstanding obligations by migrating. With the lack
of alternative enforcement mechanism, this results in credit rationing, whereby only agents with
wealth greater than a certain threshold can obtain a loan. This credit rationing is incorporated
into the model by adopting the approach proposed by Ghatak and Jiang (2002), where migrants
that failed to ful¯ll their contracts might be caught with some probability ¼ and have to receive a
nonmonetary punishment F , such as imprisonment or social sanctions. Hence, denoting one plus
the rate of interest as r, lenders will make only loans that satisfy
r[m+ ¯(s2 ¡ ¹s2)¡ °¹s¡ ½] · ¼F: (2)
Here, it is assumed that r(m ¡ ½) > ¼F , implying absence of any loan contracts in the economy,
which would enable the agent with no initial education to migrate. In addition, throughout the
section, it is assumed that the return on choosing urban jobs with additional schooling is su±ciently
high in the sense that
m¡ ½¡ ¼Fr
°
<
®
¯(1 + r)
: (3)
Below, ¼ = 0 is set without loss of generality. Consequently, migration will be a strategy only for
those who are able to ¯nance their migration and additional education with their own wealth.
2.1.4 Equilibrium
In this subsection, a particular equilibrium is presented, by sketching a solution of the model. For
details of the solution, see Appendix A.1.
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In the urban economy, migrants choose their occupations and new skills they acquire. Note
that, given obtained human capital (s), migrants' optimal occupation simply maximizes their labor
income; thus, q¤ = 1+s¤. Throughout this paper, the superscript asterisk (*) refers to the optimal
value chosen by each agent at equilibrium. Substituting this into (1), migrants' optimal labor
income becomes
y¤u = ®
µ
2 +
1
s¤
¶
| {z }
Average return to schooling
£ s¤ + ±: (4)
Earlier, an assumption of a positive ® was made. In the model, this parameter captures the
return on investment in education in an urban area. Thus, a positive value implies that the return
is higher in a city, given the assumption made in the model that the return on investment in
education is zero in a rural area. If ® were zero, migrants would obtain the same level of earnings
as non-migrants, ±, and, thus, have no incentive to migrate. In this sense, the higher return on
investment in education in an urban area drives rural-to-urban migration in this model.
Knowing the optimal level of education and preferred occupation chosen in cities, agents decide
to migrate if and only if the net gains from migration are positive. The model potentially gener-
ates multiple equilibria regarding those that migrate, and their level of education and preferred
occupation. As delineating all potential equilibria is outside the scope of this paper, the focus is on
a certain type of equilibrium, namely that in which agents are credit-constrained, by hereinafter
assuming
m¡ ½
°
< ¹su · s^; (5)
and
(1 + r)m
®
< 1 +
2(m¡ ½)
°
; (6)
where s^ ´ ¡°+
p
°2¡4¯(½¡m)+( 2®1+r )2
2¯ is the level of initial education below which the credit constraint
is binding. The ¯rst assumption can re°ect the real situation in most less developed economies,
where the highest level of education attainable in the rural sector is relatively low and most rural
agents are credit-constrained. The second assumption can be supported by signi¯cantly higher
return on investment in education (large ®) at the destination.
Given these assumptions, the following equilibrium predictions can be made.
Prediction 1 The initially educated (¹s 2 [m¡½° ; ¹su]) are willing to migrate (positive selection into
migration).
Prediction 2 Initially better-educated agents acquire more years of additional education (For non-
migrants, ¢s¤ = 0. For migrants, ¢s¤ ¸ 0 and d¢s¤=d¹s > 0) (positive selection into education).
Prediction 3 Initially better-educated agents choose higher-income occupations (For non-migrants,
q¤ = 0 and y¤r = ±. For migrants, q
¤ ¸ 1 + m¡½° , y¤u > y¤r , dq¤=d¹s > 0, and dy¤u=d¹s > 0).
The prediction 1 is empirically supported by many authors (Barnum and Sabot, 1977; Lanzona,
1998; Robinson and Tomes, 1982; McKenzie et al., 2010). Whilst testing these predictions is not
the aim of this paper, these are consistent with the data, as seen in subsection 4.4.
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2.2 Migration for Jobs after Completing Education
In addition to the mobility described in the preceding subsection 2.1, another type of mobility can
also relate the educational attainment to migration. It is recognized that people move to cities
after they acquire in the rural sector skills necessary to succeed at their destination. As explained
in Appendix A.2, the equilibrium in this type of mobility can easily be shown by slightly changing
the model structure, whereby opportunities for learning are supplied only in the rural sector with
the remaining assumptions unchanged. Hence, if agents prefer to migrate, they simply choose
occupations in cities, based on the human capital they would import from their origins. On the
other hand, in the rural sector, they have to choose between engaging in self-employed farming and
migrating after completing the education valued in the urban sector. The equilibrium predictions
of this new model structure are exactly the same as those in the previous mobility (i.e., migration
for education).
2.3 From Theory to Empirics
It is shown from the model that while higher earnings can be achieved by migrating, it, in itself,
does not guarantee the expected gains, which are driven by education. Moreover, the education
generates the gains because the rate of return on education is higher in an urban area, compared
to a rural area. These thus point towards the notion that the migration e®ect is, in fact, the
educational e®ect, which is more apparent when the earnings of agents are written in the form of
y¤ = ®
µ
2 +
1
s¤
¶
£ s¤ £M| {z }
Migration e®ect
+ ±; (7)
where M is a migration dummy, equal to one for a migrant and zero otherwise. This equation
presents that the gains from migration are small for the less educated, and that clearly, the positive
® is a source of increased migrants' earnings. Taking this together with the above equilibrium
predictions, the model eventually suggests that
Claim If the migration premium is entirely attributed to the higher return on investment in
education at the destination, no direct e®ect of migration on outcomes (income and consumption)
would exist after controlling for the current level of education and allowing for the di®erence in
the return on investment in education between the origin and the destination. Then, uneducated
individuals would not migrate. On the other hand, if a signi¯cant migration e®ect remains even
after controlling for education in an outcome equation, it would suggest that an individual's limited
investment in education may not play a major role in preventing the internal migration.
This is an underlying presupposition formally established in the model, which validates empir-
ically exploring the contribution of education in the migration premium for the question of why
not more people migrate, given so high premium.
3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical goal of this paper is to show to what extent the migration premium can be explained
by education. This section outlines the empirical strategy chosen for testing this. Throughout the
section, it is assumed that migration occurs between periods t and t + 1 and that the e®ect is
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realized in the period t+1. In the subsequent empirical analysis, the framework is ¯tted to waves
1 and 5 of the data set used. Equation (7) suggests the need to estimate the following earnings
function (whereby the framework can directly be applied to consumption),
log yit+1 = ®0 + ®1Mit+1 + ®2sit+1Mit+1 + ®3sit+1 + ®0yzy + ²it+1; (8)
where yit+1 is an individual i's earnings in the period t+1; Mit+1 takes the value of one if he/she
lives outside the original community in the period t+ 1 and zero otherwise (note that Mit = 0 for
everyone); si+1 is his/her attained educational level (years); vector zy contains other determinants
of earnings, such as age and gender; and ²it+1 is a stochastic error. To the extent that the gains
from migration are entirely attributed to the higher return on investment in education at the
destination, it can be expected that ®1 = 0 and ®2 > 0.
Empirical di±culty arises from the potential correlation between ²it+1 andMit+1, sit+1, and/or
sit+1Mit+1, because migration and education are structurally determined, as suggested in Section
2 and are thus endogenous. Suppose that this potential correlation stems from any unobserved
time-invariant factors contained in the stochastic error ²it+1 (e.g., ability not only to achieve higher
level of education and earnings but also to migrate), taking the ¯rst di®erence of (8) can solve this
problem as
¢ log yit+1 = ®0 + ®1Mit+1 + ®2sit+1Mit+1 + ®3¢sit+1 + ®0y¢zy +¢²it+1: (9)
This is a standard di®erences-in-di®erences (DID) speci¯cation (Wooldridge, 2002. p.284). If
time-varying components in ²it+1 correlate with migration and education in the earnings function,
however, the di®erenced stochastic error in (9) will still have correlation with them. Since there is
more than 10-year gap between waves 1 and 5, this is quite likely.
One possible solution to this problem is to use an instrumental variable. Since the KHDS data
is comprehensive, ¯nding variables that can explain Mit+1 and sit+1 with strong power might be
possible. As reported in Appendix Table 7, for example, estimating the probability of migration
shows that the young in wave 1 living in a village that experienced the rainfall shock were more
likely to migrate. Similarly, being the household head or spouse in wave 1 reduced the probability
of migration. Finally, young females in wave 1 showed a greater propensity to migrate as a result
of their marriage. Regarding educational attainment, the data also suggested that, in wave 1, the
young with better educated parents have achieved higher level of education by wave 5. Although
these variables might arguably be able to satisfy exclusion restriction, it is still di±cult to ¯nd
good instruments for sit+1Mit+1. One might want to instrument sit+1Mit+1 with the interactions
between two separate instruments for sit+1 andMit+1. Since this makes predicted values ofMit+1,
sit+1 and sit+1Mit+1 highly correlated, however, it is not an optimal strategy for the current study.
Alternatively, it is possible to control for original household heterogeneity by including over 800
dummies for initial households in equation (9). Whilst the estimation result, which uses within
initial household variation, might not entirely be free from the endogeneity bias, controlling for
attributes speci¯c to a migrant's original household in the growth equation is likely to absorb a
major source of potential bias. As a matter of fact, when Beegle et al. (2011) estimated the
impact of migration on consumption growth by applying an impact evaluation approach to the
KHDS data, the authors did not ¯nd a signi¯cant di®erence in the estimated migration e®ect
between DID-OLS and DID-2SLS after controlling for the initial household ¯xed e®ects in the
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growth equation. With a control of the growth ¯xed e®ects, it appears that migrants are randomly
selected at least in the growth equation of consumption.
4 Data
The data used in this paper is drawn from the Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS).
The KHDS is a longitudinal household panel survey that consists of ¯ve waves8 and started in the
rural region in northwest Tanzania, Kagera, as a part of a research project on adult mortality in
Sub-Saharan Africa launched by the World Bank in 1991.
The ¯rst four surveys were conducted between 1991 and 1994 at 6- or 7-month intervals. With
strati¯cation based on geography and mortality risk, the KHDS sample households were randomly
drawn from the 1988 Tanzanian Census. Since the chosen sampling procedure eventually generated
a sample where households with a high risk of an adult death were overweighted, the ¯ndings
reported in the subsequent sections should be treated with caution for generalization when those
health characteristics a®ect the decision of migration, the choice of occupations, and the attainment
of education. Based upon the sampling strategy, a total of 840 households were interviewed in the
¯rst wave, with the 759 households continuously contacted in the subsequent three waves. Since, in
the subsequent three waves, the households that left the study were replaced, the ¯rst four waves
eventually covered 912 households in total.
After a 10-year gap from wave 4, approximately 91% of the 912 baseline households were
recontacted in 2004 (wave 5), even if located outside their original villages. The signi¯cantly
high recontact rate is one of many successes and contributions of this long-term panel survey.
When previous members moved out of their original households, their new households were traced.
This exercise generated 2719 household surveys in wave 5, based on the original 832 recontacted
households. Of the 2719 households, only half stayed in the village they resided in 10 years
previously. This suggests a substantial demographic mobility in this region during one decade.
While the KHDS is a household panel survey, it allowed constructing unbalanced panel data
from wave 1 to 5 at individual level, as the survey collected the information of all household
members in all waves. It was noted that the rate of sample attrition in the KHDS was very low
even on an individual basis. Based upon the careful examination of sample attrition by Beegle et
al. (2011), excluding individuals that died, about 82% of 5394 original respondents interviewed in
the ¯rst four waves were successfully recontacted in wave 5.
Throughout the waves, a standardized survey questionnaire was used, although several changes
were made in wave 5. This allows collected information to be highly comparable across waves. In
addition, the data contains a variety of information related to a household and its members, such as
education, health conditions, income-generating activities (e.g., hours worked, earnings), economic
shocks, and expenditures, which makes the KHDS highly valuable resource for an empirical study.
4.1 Migration
In this study, migrants are de¯ned as those that changed residence by year 2004, which corresponds
to wave 5. Since the strategy does not include respondents that migrated during the sample periods
8Wave 1, September 1991 to May 1992; wave 2, April 1992 to November 1992; wave 3, November 1992 to May
1993; wave 4, June 1993 to January 1994; wave 5, January 2004 to August 2004.
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but did not participate in wave 5,9 the sample is limited only to respondents that participated in
both wave 5 and one of the earlier four waves. In this paper, these individuals are referred to
as `panel individuals'. In other words, respondents interviewed only in the earlier four waves and
new respondents interviewed only in wave 5 are excluded from the analysis,10 leaving 4476 panel
individuals in this study. Of those panel individuals, 1644 moved out of their original communities
between 1991 and 2004 and are referred to as migrants. In addition, migrants can be split into
those who moved out of their community, but remained within Kagera (1289 internal migrants) and
those that moved further away (355 external migrants), i.e. elsewhere in Tanzania and Uganda.11
Whilst not reported here, data show that approximately 51% and 27% of internal migrants
moved out of their original communities between the ages of 7 to 20 years and 21 to 30 years,
respectively. The corresponding ¯gures for external migrants are about 55% and 27%. In addition,
the distribution of migrants was analyzed by year of migration. As shown in Figure 1, they are
distributed over the entire sample periods with reasonable variation, although 1994 is seen as the
peak year of migration in data, which may be related to an economic trough in that year. As the
survey followed the same individuals over the 13-year period, it is likely that migrants were mostly
young at the start of the KHDS.
[Here, Figure 1]
4.2 Occupational Mobility
While Kagera is a rural area, it has seemingly been di±cult for people only to survive on self-
employed farming. Figure 2 plots each income-generating activity's share of weekly hours worked in
total by migration status. In all groups of panel individuals, farming self-employment gradually lost
the leading position, whereas non-farm wage employment and non-farm self-employed businesses
started to become more important.12 In particular, external migrants spend more than 90% of
total hours worked on non-farm wage employment and non-farm self-employment in wave 5 and,
as a result, farming self-employment ceased to be a primary income source.
However, Figure 2 does not allow to distinguish between two potential mechanisms driving this
trend. For example, panel workers across age groups may uniformly be moving away from farming
self-employment to non-farm activities. Alternatively, only new participants in a labor market (i.e.,
those that were children in wave 1) might exclusively be entering into non-farm employment once
they become working-age adults, whereas the previous elderly did not change the type of jobs that
they engaged in. More careful examination of data, which is available from the author, supports
the latter explanation.
[Here, Figure 2]
9Attrition could happen for several reasons, e.g., the di±culty in tracing individuals, or death of the previous
elderly. See Beegle et al. (2011) for the issue of sample attrition in the KHDS.
10Approximately 22% of a total of 23,915 observations of person-wave units in all ¯ve waves, excluding new
respondents in wave 5, were removed from the data set.
11Those who migrated to other countries were not traced, although there were not too many.
12One caution regarding the trend in the early 1990s is that part of the occupational mobility may be generated
by an individual's response to economic recession (income smoothing) (Kochar, 1999). This supposition may be
supported by the fact that the proportion of new non-farm businesses (aged 3 months below) was greater in waves
2 to 4, compared to other two waves.
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4.3 Welfare Changes
Following Beegle et al. (2011), this study uses per capita annual consumption, the average of the
total annual consumption of a household, as a primary individual welfare measure. In addition
to this consumption measure, the KHDS enabled the construction of two income measures - per
worker weekly income, which is computed as the sum of wage earnings, farming self-employment
income, and non-farm self-employment income for panel individuals aged 7 years or older; and
per capita weekly income, which is the average of the total weekly income of a household. After
careful examination of data, however, it was evident that migrants' earnings were measured with
excessive noise in wave 5 to be tenable to an empirical analysis. Consequently, the subsequent
analysis applies the analytical framework presented in Section 3 to consumption only.
In contrast to the income measures, the gains from migration might only indirectly be re°ected
in consumption, provided that those gains are transitory to migrants' earnings. As it appears
that most migrants in this study moved out of their original communities in their youth with
strong determination to live long and succeed at the destination, however, the shock to migrants'
earnings is more likely to be permanent. In this case, consumption could be a plausible proxy
for earnings. Another concern regarding using consumption arises from the possibility that rural
households might diversify income risks by letting some of their members migrate from their original
villages (e.g., Stark, 1981; Stark and Levhari, 1982; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). If income gains
from migration are shared with migrants' original families through the form of remittances, using
the consumption measure implicitly underestimates the gains from migration. Thus, in order
to mitigate this potential problem, the subsequent analysis includes remittance expenditures in
consumption.
Since the economic recession in the early 1990s, which followed the second oil shock and the
subsequent world recession, the Tanzanian economy has been recording a consolidating economic
improvement. While Kagera is one of the remotest regions from the administrative centre of Dar
es Salaam, a similar economic trend can be seen in the data reported in Table 1. The mean of
per capita annual consumption declines from wave 1 to 4, increasing in wave 5. The pattern is
consistent with the movement of national GDP.13 While there is almost no change in non-migrants'
consumption between waves 1 and 5, migrants have achieved positive growth. In particular, the
consumption growth of external migrants is outstanding, as the level has more than doubled from
wave 1 to 5. As a result, external migrants enjoy a higher level of consumption than do internal
migrants in wave 5, who, in turn, enjoy a higher level compared to non-migrants.
[Here, Table 1]
4.4 Goodness of Fit of the Theoretical Model to Data
This paper aims to answer the question of why migration is not more prevalent by estimating
equation (8). This approach is based upon the presupposition derived from the theoretical model
presented in Section 2. However, if the model cannot describe the empirical data with satisfactory
¯t, there is danger in estimating a completely meaningless empirical equation, as well as misin-
terpreting the estimation results. While the purpose of this study is not to prove the model, this
13According to World Economic Outlook Database (IMF, September 2004), GDP per capita gradually declined
from 1990 to 1994 and has been recording a continuous growth since then (as of 2005) - http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/02/data/.
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section reports on checks performed in order to verify whether the data bear several assumptions
and predictions explained in the theory. In the model, it was assumed that (1) the return on
investment in education was higher at the destination than was at the origin and (2) the initial
educational level was positively correlated with the pre-migration level of wealth. The model also
showed that (3) at equilibrium, in which a credit constraint was binding, those who were initially
educated were more likely to migrate (positive selection into migration); (4) those who were ini-
tially educated were more likely to invest in further education (positive selection into education);
(5) some individuals chose to migrate in order to attain further education, whereas others migrated
after obtaining it; and (6) those who were initially educated would be better o® in the end. The
assumption (1) is a part of the hypothesis tested in this paper, and is thus discussed in Section 5.
The other assumptions and predictions are brie°y checked in this subsection before moving onto
estimation results.
Since the data set contains several indicators of wealth, such as non-food expenditures, land
area cultivated by households, household livestock, and household capital for farming (e.g., farm
buildings, hand mills, tractors) and non-farming (e.g., buildings, vehicles, bicycles, tools), a simple
way of testing for presence of positive correlation between the pre-migration educational level and
wealth is to regress these wealth variables on either individual or household average education
by exploiting data in wave 1. However, as there is a large number of missing observations for
the livestock and capital stocks, this exercise was possible only for the non-food expenditures and
cultivated land. The log of per capita non-food consumption and land area cultivated by house-
holds, measured by acres, were estimated in Appendix Table 6, where an individual's education
is measured by years based upon the highest grade that he/she completed by the time of each
wave. Firstly, the signi¯cantly positive correlation between the pre-migration level of non-food
consumption and education was identi¯ed in columns (a) and (b). Using the log of per capita
consumption as a dependent variable also identi¯ed the strong positive correlation in columns (c)
and (d). Turning to the cultivated land area, columns (e) and (f) show that it positively correlates
with the pre-migration level of education with the conventional level of signi¯cance.
In Table 2, panel respondents who were interviewed in both waves 1 and 5 are categorized by
age in wave 1 and migration status to see how both the initial completed level and the subsequent
attainment of education (years) are related to migration. It can be seen from the table that
migrants in wave 5 are more educated than non-migrants and that this is true even before they
migrate. With the exception of the youngest cohort in wave 5, a clear positive trend in the level of
education from external migrants to non-migrants exists in both waves and in all age categories.
In addition, it seems that external migrants under the age of 20 years in wave 1 have acquired a
greater amount of new skills and knowledge over time than did non-migrants and internal migrants.
For example, the mean number of attained years of education was 5.7 for external migrants aged
7 to 15 in wave 1, which is more than one year longer than that of non-migrants and internal
migrants. Similarly, external migrants' educational attainment was 1.4 years in the age category of
16 to 20 years, whereas that of non-migrants and internal migrants was less than one year. These
observations are broadly compatible with the above predictions (3) and (4). More formally, the
estimation results in Appendix Table 7 also support these predictions.
As data presented in Table 2 does not indicate when (before or after migration) and, hence,
where (origin or destination) migrants have acquired the additional education. Thus, in order to
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establish this, we compared the reasons for migration of those who have acquired education greater
than the mean attainment of non-migrants and those who have not, and this is shown in Table
3. About a quarter of external migrants in the group of greater educational attainment migrated
for the purpose of attaining further education, which is the most important reason for this group
of migrants (column (c)). On the other hand, migration for sole purpose of gaining education is
less important for internal migrants (column (a)). The table suggests that most internal migrants
who acquired greater education during the sample periods moved out after completing schooling
in their origins. This di®erence between internal and external migrants can broadly be mirrored
in the two types of mobility described in the above prediction (5).
It was shown in subsection 4.3 that external migrants were better o® than were internal mi-
grants in wave 5, as well as that internal migrants were better o® than non-migrants in terms of
consumption. Table 2 also shows that there was a clear declining trend in the pre-migration level
of education, from external migrants to non-migrants in each age cohort. These observations point
to the above prediction (6).
[Here, Tables 2 and 3]
5 Estimation Results
Pooling migrants into one group, columns (a) and (b) in Table 4 report the estimation result
of (9) with either initial village ¯xed e®ects or initial household ¯xed e®ects. After controlling
for education and allowing for the di®erence in the return on investment in education between
migrants' origin and destination, no signi¯cant migration e®ect was found. As anticipated, the
return on an additional year of schooling is higher at migrants' destination by about 3-4%. As
an individual's consumption is measured through the level of household average in this paper,
alternatively, columns (c) and (d) exploited the average level of household education as a proxy for
an individual's education. Implications from the analysis are unchanged, i.e. there is no migration
premium. In these columns, one additional year of educational attainment (in terms of household
average) now adds about 10 percentage points to migrants' consumption, which almost doubles
non-migrants' return on investment in education. As the sample mean of migrants' education is
5.95 years (4.36 years in case of household average) in wave 5, these results suggest that migrating
out with this level of education can result in an increase in consumption of approximately 21-25
percentage points.14 No migration premium with higher return on investment in education at the
destination suggests that those who have no education will choose not to migrate.
Migrants are split into two groups in columns (e) and (f). In case of internal migration, as
before, there is no signi¯cant migration e®ect and the return on investment in migrants' education
is higher than that of non-migrants. Regarding external migration, education is, again, more
valuable at the destination, although the signi¯cance is rather weak, probably due to a relatively
small number of external migrants (just about 7% of total observations). In contrast to internal
migration, however, a large signi¯cant e®ect of external migration remains. This suggests that
limited educational attainment only partly plays a role in preventing external migration. Using
the average level of household education hardly a®ects these ¯ndings in columns (g) and (h). With
5.63 (individual level) and 3.95 (household average) years of the mean level of internal migrants'
14In column (b), for example, 0.036 £ 5.95 years ¼ 0.21, whereas 0.057 £ 4.36 years ¼ 0.25 in column (d).
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education in wave 5 (7.01 and 5.73 years for external migrants, respectively), these results suggest
that internal (external) migrants achieve consumption growth by about 17% (20-25%) if they
migrate with the mean level of education.
The remaining premium associated with external migration might be due to the analysis not
accounting for the heterogeneity of migrants. Table 5 groups migrants by destination in order
to reveal the reasons for migration. At both destinations, marriage is a primary reason for the
migration of females. On the other hand, economic motives largely appear to drive the migration
of males. Seeking business opportunities and better jobs are the key reasons for external migration
of males. The lack of arable land is also an important reason for internal male migrants. The recent
increase in population in this region might have caused this trend (Mitti and Rweyemamu, 2001).
Seeking a higher level of education is another common reason for external migration, accounting
for about 15% of the movement of such migrants. Pooling internal and external migrants, about
48% of male migrants moved for economic or educational reasons, whereas about 47% of female
migrants moved for marriage. Apart from natural disasters, it seems that marriage, economic
motives, and education are key factors driving an individual's self-selection into migration.
As the analytical framework adopted in this paper is based upon economic or educational
migration, migrants that moved for the purpose of marriage were excluded in Appendix Table 8
as a robustness check.15 The estimation results are almost una®ected. Even after limiting the
number of migrants, it seems that education does not fully account for the gains from external
migration.
Similarly, another exercise excluded migrants aged 20 years or above in wave 1, given that the
analytical framework in this paper is more likely to be true of young respondents at baseline, which
did not make di®erence in implications from the analysis, however (Appendix Table 9).
The higher return on some non-education capital at the destination, which rural agents need
to succeed, may account for the remaining premium of external migration. In case of wage jobs,
for example, non-cognitive skills, such as dependability, self-discipline, persistence, sociability and
docility may be valued at the destination (e.g., Heckman et al., 2006). Starting and running a non-
farm self-employed business may also require a broad range of resources, including facilities and
personal capabilities (e.g., self-determination, business acumen). Our ¯ndings show an interesting
education-distance trade-o®, whereby education can fully explain the gains associated with internal
migration, but only partly those of external migration. This trade-o® suggests that acquiring any
capital, other than education, becomes more important if rural agents migrate farther away from
their origin. Since it appears that destination located at a greater distance from the origin is
more developed and o®ers jobs that require complex skills and technologies, this trade-o® might
highlight the importance of having skills not simply attained through acquiring formal education
and/or physical capital (as well as education) in case of long-distance migration. Alternatively,
social capital (e.g., friends and relatives living at the destination) that can provide rural agents
with adequate information about destination markets may also be rewarded at the destination
(Munshi, 2003; Yamauchi and Tanabe, 2008). Given that the more distant the destination is,
the more uncertain rural agents are about earnings opportunities at the destination, the trade-o®
might underscore the role of social capital in mitigating information asymmetry between the origin
and the destination. Exploring these alternatives can be a topic for future research.
15Whilst not reported here, another exercise excluded migrants forced to relocate due to natural disasters as well
as migrants solely motivated by marriage. Implications remained unchanged.
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[Here, Tables 4 and 5]
6 Conclusion
While the impact evaluation approach can give us a reduced-from interpretation of migration
e®ect, it fails to answer an important question of why migration is not more widespread if it
provides such high returns. Using long-term household panel data drawn from rural Tanzania,
this paper attempted to answer this question by exploring to what extent the migration premium
can be explained by education. Initially, it was expected that, if the premium is eliminated by
controlling for the current level of education and allowing for the di®erence in the return on
investment in education between migrants' origin and destination in an outcome equation, those
uneducated individuals would choose not to migrate. On the other hand, if a signi¯cant migration
e®ect remains, despite the presence of a full set of controls, the evidence would indicate that limited
investment in education might not be a major factor in preventing internal mobility from becoming
a source of raising welfare.
Identifying the returns on migration and investment in education in an outcome equation
is a hard empirical task because migration and education are structurally determined and thus
endogeneous. To address this endogeneity, this study took a di®erences-in-di®erences approach
with a control of initial household ¯xed e®ects. Separating migrants into those who moved out
of original villages but remained within Kagera and those that left Kagera, we found that, in
consumption, the return on investment in education was, indeed, higher at both destinations and
that higher returns fully explained the gains from internal migration but only partly explained
those associated with external migration. These ¯ndings suggest that welfare opportunities are
higher at the destination and that an individual's limited investment in education plays a major role
in preventing short-distance migration, but not long-distance migration. While education plays a
role, other mechanisms may prohibit rural agents from exploiting the arbitrage opportunity when
they migrate to the destination located at a great distance from their origin.
Apart from general equilibrium e®ects, these ¯ndings yield two closely related policy implica-
tions regarding the distribution of welfare and population in an economy. Firstly, providing rural
peasants with small credit, just enough to cover the cost of resettlement without relaxing their
constraint to invest in education, may not considerably in°uence the distribution. This is because
successful migration has to be associated with su±cient investment in education. Secondly, while
promoting rural agents' educational attainment can, indeed, change the distribution pattern by
encouraging their migration, the impact may be limited when they relocate to highly advanced
areas. In the context of this study, moving outside Kagera was seen as migrating to more developed
areas, compared to those internal migrants could choose as their destination. Our ¯ndings showed
an interesting trade-o® between the importance of education and the distance to the destination.
This might highlight that having a variety of capital (e.g., skills not measured by education, busi-
ness facilities, or social networks), as well as education, becomes more important as migrants move
to the destination at a greater distance from their origin.
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A Appendix: Model in Section 2
A.1 Solution of the Model in Section 2.1
A.1.1 Migrants' Occupation and Schooling Decision
In the urban economy, migrants choose their occupations and new skills they acquire, so their
decision problem could be
max
fq;sg
®
£
2q ¡ (q ¡ s)2¤+ ± ¡ ¯(s2 ¡ ¹s2)¡m+ r[°¹s+ ½¡m¡ ¯(s2 ¡ ¹s2)] (A.1)
subject to ¢s ¸ 0 (non-negativity constraint of additional schooling, ¢s ´ s¡ ¹s) and m+ ¯(s2 ¡
¹s2) · °¹s+ ½ (credit constraint).
As already described in subsection 2.1.4, ¯rstly, note that given obtained human capital (s),
an optimal occupation simply maximizes migrants' labor income; thus q¤ = 1 + s¤.
The ¯rst order condition of migrants' schooling decision is
@yu
@s|{z}
MB of schooling
= 2¯s|{z}
MC of schooling (direct cost)
+ 2¯rs|{z}
MC of schooling (opportunity cost)
¡ ¸1 + 2¯¸2s; (A.2)
where ¸1 ¸ 0 and ¸2 ¸ 0 are Lagrange multipliers for the non-negativity constraint of additional
schooling and credit constraint, respectively. Marginal bene¯t and marginal cost are abbreviated
as \MB" and \MC," respectively. The marginal cost of schooling includes the opportunity cost
of foregone interest income, as well as direct cost (e.g., tuition fees). Appendix Figure 3 precisely
shows the entire path of the optimal value of occupation, schooling, and additional schooling of
migrants, where s^ ´ ¡°+
p
°2¡4¯(½¡m)+( 2®1+r )2
2¯ .
16 When ¹s 2 [0; m¡½° ), no one can a®ord the cost of
migration, m; therefore, the ¯gure omits this group of people from the optimal path.
Suppose a migrant's initial level of schooling is in the interval ¹s 2 (m¡½° , s^], the marginal bene¯t
of schooling is greater than the marginal cost of schooling, @yu@s > 2¯s + 2¯rs. Thus, migrants
are willing to obtain additional education, leading them to higher income jobs. However, since
they do not have su±cient wealth to achieve the schooling level of their ¯rst best, they attempt to
obtain as much additional education as possible (¸1 = 0, ¸2 > 0). As a result, migrants acquire
more new skills to get higher income jobs, as they are initially more educated (wealthier). In the
interval ¹s 2 (s^; ®¯(1+r) ], migrants are no longer credit constrained (¸1 = 0, ¸2 = 0). Everybody
whose initial level of schooling falls in this range acquires new skills to achieve the same level of
education ®¯(1+r) and to choose the same level of occupation 1+
®
¯(1+r) , so that
@yu
@s = 2¯s + 2¯rs.
Since the optimal level of schooling is the same between migrants, their educational attainment is
smaller, as they are initially more educated. In the case where ¹s 2 ( ®¯(1+r) , 1), the marginal cost
of attaining additional education is signi¯cantly large, @yu@s < 2¯s + 2¯rs because they are already
highly educated in the rural economy. Then, they optimally choose not to acquire new skills and
select occupations in accordance with their initial level of schooling (¸1 > 0, ¸2 = 0).
16Optimal solutions of q¤, s¤, and ¢s¤ are
(q¤; s¤;¢s¤) =
8>>><>>>:
(1 + m¡½
°
; m¡½
°
; 0) for ¹s = m¡½
°
(1 +
q
¯¹s2+°¹s+½¡m
¯
;
q
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¯
;
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¯
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:
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This diversity in the relationship between the initial level of schooling and the optimal behavior
avoids providing an unique answer for the question of whether it is the more (or less) educated in
the rural economy who attain more additional education in cities, depending on where ¹su is located
in the distribution of the initial schooling. To the extent that m¡½° < ¹su · s^, then it will be those
in the upper tail of the distribution ¹s 2 (m¡½° ; ¹su] who acquire more new skills in the urban sector.
To the contrary, if ®¯(1+r) < ¹su, those who are relatively educated at the origin ¹s 2 ( ®¯(1+r) , ¹su]
will be reluctant to attain additional education once they migrate. In the case where s^ < ¹su ·
®
¯(1+r) , migrants who are initially in the intermediate level of schooling distribution are more likely
to acquire new skills. All these possibilities, together with the migration decision explained in the
next subsection, potentially generate multiple equilibria regarding those that migrate, and their
level of education and preferred occupation. While it might not be impossible to describe them
comprehensively, doing so is outside the scope of this paper. In the main body of this paper, thus,
the focus was on a certain type of equilibrium, namely that in which agents are credit-constrained,
by assuming that m¡½° < ¹su · s^. However, this should not be interpreted as an artifact just for
computational reasons. Rather, this re°ects the real situation in most less developed countries,
where the highest level of education attainable in the rural sector is relatively low.
[Here, Appendix Figure 3]
A.1.2 Selection into Migration
Knowing the optimal level of education and preferred occupation chosen in cities, agents will decide
to migrate if and only if the net gains from migration, v¤(¹s), are positive:
v¤(¹s) = y¤u ¡ y¤r ¡ ¯(s¤2 ¡ ¹s2)| {z }
Direct cost of schooling
¡ m|{z}
Moving cost
¡ r¯(s¤2 ¡ ¹s2)| {z }
Opportunity cost of schooling
¡ rm|{z}
Opportunity cost of movement
> 0;(A.3)
where y¤u = ®
¡
2 + 1s¤
¢
s¤ + ± and y¤r = ±. Suppose there exists ¹Sm ´ f¹s 2 R : v¤(¹s) > 0g, an
answer for the questions of who migrates and who chooses what level of occupations and education
depends upon where ¹Sm and ¹su lie in the distribution of initial schooling. As already mentioned,
delineating all potential equilibria is outside the scope of this paper. In subsection 2.1.4, thus, a
particular equilibrium was shown by additionally assuming (1+r)m® < 1 +
2(m¡½)
° .
A.1.3 Equilibrium
Given all assumptions made in the model, the following lemma could simplify the task to demon-
strate equilibrium predictions presented in subsection 2.1.4.
Lemma For all ¹s 2
h
m¡½
° , s^
i
, if an agent of type ¹s0 prefers to migrate, all agents ¹s > ¹s0 are
strictly better-o® in the urban sector.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. See Appendix A.1.4.
Proposition All agents ¹s ¸ m¡½° optimally choose to migrate into the urban sector in equilibrium,
whereas agents ¹s < m¡½° stay in the rural sector.
Proof See Appendix A.1.4.
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A.1.4 Proof
Proof of Lemma: Suppose the contrary. If an agent of type ¹s0 prefers to migrate and all agents
¹s > ¹s0 are weakly better-o® in the rural sector, it must be that v¤(¹s0) > 0 and v¤(¹s) · 0. This
means that v¤(¹s0) > v¤(¹s). Denoting s¤(¹s0) as s¤0 and s¤(¹s) as s¤, it can be shown that for all ¹s 2h
m¡½
° , s^
i
,
v¤(¹s0)¡ v¤(¹s) = (s¤0 ¡ s¤) [2®¡ ¯(1 + r)(s¤0 + s¤)] + ¯(1 + r)(¹s0 + ¹s)(¹s0 ¡ ¹s): (A.4)
From Appendix Figure 3, it is clear that s¤0 < s¤ and s
¤0+s¤
2 <
®
¯(1+r) . Hence, this results in v
¤(¹s0)
< v¤(¹s), which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition: In order to show that all agents ¹s ¸ m¡½° optimally choose to migrate, it
is enough to show that an agent ¹s = m¡½° is willing to migrate by lemma.
v¤
µ
m¡ ½
°
¶
= ®
·
1 +
2(m¡ ½)
°
¸
¡ (1 + r)m: (A.5)
Under my assumption, this is positive. Hence, all agents ¹s ¸ m¡½° prefer to migrate. Also, it is
straightforward that agents ¹s < m¡½° stay in the rural sector because they cannot a®ord the cost
of migration.
To claim that this is the mobility in equilibrium, I have to ensure that parameters exist to
satisfy all preceding restrictions: (a) m¡½° <
®
¯(1+r) , (b)
m¡½
° < ¹su ·
¡°+
p
°2¡4¯(½¡m)+( 2®1+r )2
2¯ ,
and (c) (1+r)m® < 1 +
2(m¡½)
° . Since seven unknown parameters (®, ¯, °, ½, r, m, ¹su) exist, it is
possible to ¯nd parameters that simultaneously satisfy these restrictions.
A.2 Migration for Jobs after Completing Education
In addition to the mobility described in subsection 2.1, another type of mobility can also relate the
educational attainment to migration. It is recognized that people move to cities after they acquire
in the rural sector skills necessary to succeed at their destination. The equilibrium in this type of
mobility can easily be shown by slightly changing the model structure, whereby opportunities for
learning are supplied only in the rural sector with the remaining assumptions unchanged. Hence,
if agents prefer to migrate, they simply choose occupations in cities, based on the human capital
they would import from their origins. On the other hand, in the rural sector, they have to choose
between engaging in self-employed farming and migrating after completing the education valued
in the urban sector.
A.2.1 Migrants' Occupational Choice
Migrants' decision problem in the urban economy simply becomes
max
fqg
®
£
2q ¡ (q ¡ s¤)2¤+ ±; (A.6)
where s¤ is the equilibrium level of education imported from their origins. Solving this yields
q¤ = 1 + s¤.
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A.2.2 Schooling Decision
In the rural economy, no one invests in schooling if they do not migrate, and non-migrants simply
engage in self-employed farming. This is because education is not rewarded in the rural area. On
the other hand, if agents prefer to migrate, they have to decide how many new skills to acquire
before migrating. The decision problem is
max
fsg
®
£
2q ¡ (q ¡ s)2¤+ ± ¡ ¯(s2 ¡ ¹s2)¡m+ r[°¹s+ ½¡m¡ ¯(s2 ¡ ¹s2)] (A.7)
subject to q = 1 + s, ¢s ¸ 0 and m+ ¯(s2 ¡ ¹s2) · °¹s+ ½.
A.2.3 Equilibrium
The solution of (A.6) and (A.7) is exactly the same as one in the previous mobility (i.e., migration
for education). Given the solution, agents decide whether to migrate based upon (A.3). Thus, the
equilibrium predictions are the same as before, except for migrants attaining additional education
before migrating.
A.3 Uncertainty
Since the model has assumed no uncertainty, how its inclusion into the model would a®ect an
empirical strategy drawn from the model is a natural concern. Three main uncertainties may exist,
namely those with respect to the return on investment in education, gaining employment (e.g.,
Mountford, 1997; Beine et al., 2001), and skill matching.17 Two words deserve mentioning. Firstly,
as an agent's decision to invest in migration and education is now a®ected by their expectation,
there is a concern that a systematic pattern about an individual's selection into migration and
education predicted in the model may no longer hold. It is now possible that those who originally
did not migrate in a non-stochastic world would do so, expecting to achieve higher income, or
vice versa (as long as credit constraint is not binding). As seen in subsection 4.4, however, data
appears to be relatively consistent with original predictions. This suggests that the expectation
e®ect on an individual's investment decision may not be so strong to break the model's ¯t to the
empirical data. Secondly, equation (7) may not be a®ected by the ¯rst two types of uncertainties,
as nothing changes about the actual return realized, although migrants' education level achieved at
the equilibrium di®ers from that in a non-stochastic world. In case of the last uncertainty, migrants
may lose income if available urban jobs are limited and they failed to attain optimal education
and skills required to obtain those jobs because of inaccurate information they possess. In this
case, migration itself reduces earnings after controlling for education in an income equation. In
fact, this can be tested by introducing a migration dummy into (7), as well as its interaction with
education, although an empirical analysis rejected it.
[Here, Appendix Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9]
17One simple way of introducing the ¯rst uncertainty is just to use the expected value of ®. Regarding the second,
the model can assume that migrants can obtain jobs with some positive probability p. The third uncertainty can be
introduced by changing the model structure. For example, it could be assumed that only one urban job (qu) exists
and that rural agents have only a belief about it, e.g., N(¹q; ¾2). The ¾2 will capture the accuracy of information
owned by each agent.
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B Appendix: Data (Not for Publication)
B.1 Sampling Procedure
With strati¯cation based on geography and mortality risk, the KHDS sample households were
randomly drawn through two stages: selection of clusters and selection of households. In the ¯rst
stage, 550 geographical areas (communities) delineated by the 1988 Tanzanian Census were initially
classi¯ed into eight strata de¯ned over four agronomic zones and the level of adult mortality (high
and low) in each zone. Then, six or seven communities were selected from each stratum, which
generated 51 clusters (of 49 communities). In the second stage, 16 sample households were drawn
from each of the 51 clusters. In order to draw the sample, households in each selected cluster were
enumerated, which amounted to more than 29,000 in all selected clusters, and were sorted into two
groups according to information on adult mortality and morbidity within households: sick or well.
In every cluster, 14 households were ¯nally selected at random from the sick group and 2 from the
well group. See User0s Guide to the Kagera Health and Development Survey Datasets, 2004;
Kagera Health and Development Survey 2004 ¡ Basic Information Document, 2006 for more
detailed sampling design.
The ¯rst four surveys were conducted between 1991 and 1994 at 6- or 7-month intervals. Based
upon the sampling strategy explained in the previous paragraph, a total of 840 households were
interviewed in the ¯rst wave,18 with the 759 households continuously contacted in the subsequent
three waves. Since the subsequent three waves replaced households that dropped from the sample,19
the ¯rst four waves eventually covered 912 households in total. By the number of interviews
conducted, the 912 households can break down into: 39 households interviewed once, 45 households
twice, 69 households three times, and 759 households interviewed throughout the waves.
After a 10-year gap from wave 4, approximately 91% of the 912 baseline households were
recontacted in 2004 (wave 5), even if located outside their original villages. The signi¯cantly
high recontact rate is one of many successes and contributions of this long-term panel survey.
When previous members moved out of their original households, their new households were traced.
This exercise generated 2719 household surveys in wave 5, based on the original 832 recontacted
households.
B.2 Income Measurement Issues
Whilst this study constructed income measures, those measures could not be used in an empirical
analysis because of excessive noise in wave 5. This section summarizes several issues in measuring
earnings from the KHDS. More formal and exhaustive discussions, including empirical evidence,
are available from the author.
The survey questionnaire allowed me to construct two possible income measures for each indi-
vidual: per worker weekly income and per capita weekly income (average of the total labor income
of a household), both of which are computed as the sum of wage earnings, farming self-employment
income, and non-farm self-employment income. As the reference periods of recorded income were
18The 840 households consist of 816 original households selected from the enumeration based upon the sampling
strategy explained in the previous paragraph (16 households £ 51 clusters) and extra 24 households taken from the
list of replacement. The extra sample was added when the ¯eld team sensed that some original households were
likely to drop out or to provide poor information.
19Approximately 80% of the attrition was due to the relocation of households.
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di®erent between income generating activities in the questionnaire: 1 week for wage employment,
1 year (or 6 months in waves 2 to 4) for farming self-employment, and 2 weeks for non-farm self-
employment, the time average was simply taken to compute weekly income. As opposed to wage
earnings that respondents aged 7 years or older individually reported, both farming and non-farm
self-employment incomes were collected on a household basis. Thus, in per worker income measure,
they were assigned to each household member in proportion to hours worked on those activities
in the past 7 days, which were individually reported by respondents aged 7 years or older in a
di®erent section from sections collecting household-level self-employment income.20 As a result,
per worker income measure is constructed only for panel individuals aged 7 years or older.
The two income measures show a substantial di®erence. In contrast to per worker income
(and per capita consumption presented in Table 1), noticeably, non-migrants achieved the highest
earnings in wave 5 in terms of the median of the per capita income. After the exhaustive exam-
ination of the accuracy of these income measures, I found myself seriously underestimating the
income of migrants' household (in particular, external migrants) in wave 5 relative to its actual
amount. In other words, household income (latent income) that is not contained in these income
measures exists in wave 5 and this problem is more serious for migrants. To see this more formally,
household (annual) consumption was regressed on household (weekly) income with the control of
remittances received and other non-labor income earned in the past 6 months in Appendix Table
11. Here, households are de¯ned as migrants in waves 1 to 4 if they supply at least one member
who moved out of his original community between 1991 and 2004, and in wave 5 if they contain at
least one panel migrant as a member. Suppose that a household's income is correctly measured, it
is expected that the elasticity of consumption with respect to labor income is almost identical in all
groups (and, probably, over time). While the estimated coe±cients are relatively stable between
groups in waves 1 to 4, the results show a large variation in columns (d) to (f) in wave 5. The
elasticity is much smaller in migrants' regressions in wave 5 and, in particular, the null of zero
correlation is not rejected in case of external migrants.
Two main reasons account for this latent income problem: ¯rstly, given the way of constructing
income measures, I systematically failed to capture household workers engaged in wage employment
and non-farm self-employment due to the di®erence in the periodicity between income generating
activities in the survey questionnaire. For example, if one does not happen to engage in those
activities at the point of survey, I lose his contribution to household income, even though he usually
makes a living from wage jobs or non-farm self-employed activities. In this case, I will underestimate
household income more seriously as the household's main economic activities concentrate more on
wage employment, and non-farm self-employment and as the access to such activities becomes
more irregular. Taking into account the occupational mobility towards non-farm activities and
generally episodic urban occupations, it is highly likely that I failed to capture the full extent of
workers available to (in particular, external) migrants' households in wave 5. The other reason is
that a relatively large number of households did not report the fortnightly income from non-farm
self-employed businesses in wave 5 despite some of their members reporting positive hours worked
on those activities in the past 7 days.
After recognizing these problems, I realized that per worker weekly income was more accurate
than per capita income for two reasons: ¯rstly, the latent income problem conceptually una®ects per
20Thus, adult and child workers are equally weighted in terms of their e±ciency in the analysis.
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worker income and, hence, it is accurate as long as the reported income is correct. This is because
the way of constructing per worker measure ensures that collected household income is allocated
only to those who actually earned it in accordance with their contribution. On the other hand, per
capita income is very vulnerable to the problem. Since we are not correctly measuring earnings
at the household level, neither are we at the per capita level. Secondly, I expect that per capita
income measure is generally very sensitive to the demographic structure of the household. Data
show that the proportion of workers is smaller in external migrants' households than in the other
groups in wave 5, which implies lower per capita income. On the other hand, the size of migrants'
households is smaller than that of non-migrants in wave 5 and that it is likely to increase per
capita income. As a result, it seems that how the demographic structure of household in°uences
per capita income is more complicated than I think and that it more easily detracts from the
comparability between individuals and waves when there is a large heterogeneity in the household
structure and the pattern of individual labor allocation between activities. In fact, I found a large
number of unreasonable observations in wave 5: many migrants (in particular, external migrants)
with lower per capita weekly income but higher per capita annual consumption.
Unfortunately, however, even the per worker income is still unreliable in wave 5. Firstly, per
worker income does not contain many external migrants in wave 5 (approximately 3.8% of total
panel workers earning income), and even when it does, external migrants' per worker income is
mainly calculated from earnings information on non-farm wage activities (approximately 67% of
total external migrant workers earning income), not on non-farm self-employed activities. In ad-
dition, the accuracy of measured per worker income is not guaranteed either. Whilst the results
are not reported to save spaces, I estimated per worker earnings functions by activity (wage em-
ployment, farming self-employment, and non-farm self-employment), group (non-migrants, internal
migrants, and external migrants), and wave (pooled waves 1 to 4 and wave 5) to test the accuracy
of reported income. The estimation results suggest that migrants' earnings functions in both wage
employment and non-farm self-employment are poorly identi¯ed relative to those of non-migrants
in wave 5.
B.3 Descriptions of Welfare Variables
Per Capita Annual Consumption
Per capita annual consumption is the average of the total annual consumption of a household.
The processed household-level consumption is publicly available and composed of food consump-
tion (seasonal and non-seasonal) and non-food consumption (education and health expenditures,
miscellaneous non-food expenditures, etc.). See Kagera Health and Development Survey ¡
Consumption Expenditure Data for details at http://www.edi-africa.com/research/khds/
introduction.htm.
Per Worker Weekly Income
Per worker weekly income is the sum of the following individual income: wage earnings, non-farm
self-employment income, and farming self-employment income. The KHDS collected individual
wage earnings in the past 7 days. This includes salary after deduction of all taxes, per diem
allowances, bonuses, incentives, gratuities, overtime income, payment in kind, and so forth. Non-
farm self-employment income is the sum of net pro¯ts from all non-farm household businesses.
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This is calculated by adding the value of products consumed or used by households for their use to
net cash revenues from those businesses. Since income reference periods for non-farm self-employed
activities were the past 2 weeks, the time average was simply taken to compute weekly income.
To construct an individual income measure, the household income was ¯nally allocated to each
household member in proportion to an individual's hours worked on those activities in the past
7 days, which were individually reported in a di®erent section from sections collecting household-
level self-employment income. Farming self-employment income is the household-level annual (or
6-month in waves 2 to 4) net pro¯ts from self-employed farming and livestock activities. This is
calculated by adding the value of crops and crop- or livestock-related home products consumed or
used by households or lost for some reasons (e.g., natural disasters, thefts) to net cash revenues
from those activities. As in the case of non-farm self-employment income, the weekly income is the
time average of annual (or 6-month) income and the household-level weekly income was assigned
to each household member in proportion to an individual's hours worked on those activities in the
past 7 days.
Per Capita Weekly Income
Per capita weekly income is the average of the total weekly income of a household. The household
income consists of the income from the activities described before: wage employment, non-farm
self-employment, and farming self-employment.
Price Index
All monetary values in this paper are transformed into baseline prices (1991 prices) by using
the Laspeyres and Fisher indices, both of which are in the public domain and constructed by
household-wave group. See Kagera Health and Development Survey ¡ Price index for details
at http://www.edi-africa.com/research/khds/introduction.htm.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Non-migrants Internal migrants External migrants
Mean Std. No. of Mean Std. No. of Mean Std. No. of
obs. obs. obs.
(1) Per capita annual consumption (US dollars, 1991 price)
Wave 1 213.14 (139.26) 2426 221.23 (137.57) 972 229.20* (142.52) 291
Wave 2 192.49 (144.01) 2422 184.70 (114.85) 924 192.62 (128.94) 276
Wave 3 176.16 (109.74) 2353 170.65 (97.44) 870 184.25 (107.77) 247
Wave 4 172.47 (99.93) 2223 171.27 (93.29) 797 173.55 (107.91) 222
Wave 5 214.91 (162.00) 2829 279.99*** (240.36) 1287 520.07*** (481.11) 352
(2) Gender (one if male)
Wave 1-4 0.52 (0.49) 9425 0.37*** (0.48) 3564 0.48** (0.50) 1038
Wave 5 0.52 (0.49) 2832 0.38*** (0.48) 1289 0.47 (0.50) 355
(3) Education (years)
Own
Wave 1-4 2.56 (3.08) 9426 2.73*** (3.15) 3564 3.12*** (3.34) 1038
Wave 5 4.69 (3.22) 2811 5.49*** (3.35) 1280 6.70*** (3.49) 350
Household average
Wave 1-4 2.67 (1.46) 9426 2.74** (1.49) 3564 2.99*** (1.45) 1038
Wave 5 3.48 (1.94) 2808 3.90*** (2.43) 1280 5.45*** (2.95) 347
(4) Age (years)
Own
Wave 1-4 22.29 (19.28) 9425 15.33*** (12.13) 3564 14.85*** (11.81) 1038
Wave 5 33.00 (19.36) 2832 26.99*** (12.33) 1289 26.26*** (11.29) 355
Household average
Wave 1-4 21.66 (8.23) 9425 21.55 (7.12) 3564 21.82 (7.02) 1038
Wave 5 25.18 (11.11) 2832 21.79*** (9.23) 1289 21.43*** (7.15) 355
Household head
Wave 1-4 48.16 (15.31) 9426 49.92*** (16.03) 3564 52.21*** (16.50) 1038
Wave 5 49.72 (17.52) 2811 39.48*** (15.22) 1280 35.62*** (13.56) 350
(5) Household size
Wave 1-4 7.45 (3.66) 9424 7.74*** (3.58) 3564 8.47*** (4.45) 1038
Wave 5 5.92 (3.18) 2832 4.83*** (2.60) 1289 4.55*** (2.72) 355
(6) Proportion of household members aged 15 to 40
Male
Wave 1-4 0.03 (0.08) 9424 0.02*** (0.07) 3564 0.01*** (0.05) 1038
Wave 5 0.08 (0.17) 2832 0.10*** (0.23) 1289 0.17*** (0.30) 355
Female
Wave 1-5 0.02 (0.07) 9424 0.03*** (0.07) 3564 0.02 (0.06) 1038
Wave 5 0.05 (0.11) 2832 0.13*** (0.17) 1289 0.15*** (0.24) 355
Notes: (1) Unit of observations is a person-wave. (2) In per capita measures, all members in the same household-
wave group are recorded with the same numerical values. (3) The equality of means between non-migrants and
internal migrants and that between non-migrants and external migrants are examined by T-tests, assuming unequal
variance. The degree of freedom is approximated by Satterthwaite. *** denotes the rejection of equality at 1%, **
at 5%, and * at 10%.
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Table 2: Migration and Educational Attainment by Age in Wave 1
Age Wave 1 Wave 5 Growth No. of panel
in wave 1 Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. individuals
in wave 1
Below 7 Non-migrants - - 4.40 (2.60) 4.40 (2.60) 609
years old Internal migrants - - 4.27 (2.87) 4.27 (2.87) 198
External migrants - - 4.91 (3.17) 4.91 (3.17) 58
7 to 15 Non-migrants 1.56 (1.99) 6.05 (3.09) 4.49 (3.20) 587
years old Internal migrants 1.68 (2.07) 6.15 (3.08) 4.47 (3.03) 427
External migrants 2.00 (2.05) 7.73 (3.02) 5.73 (3.10) 134
16 to 20 Non-migrants 5.75 (2.43) 6.52 (2.34) 0.77 (1.70) 253
years old Internal migrants 6.20 (2.23) 7.17 (2.37) 0.97 (1.68) 174
External migrants 6.84 (2.23) 8.26 (2.56) 1.42 (1.99) 50
21 to 30 Non-migrants 5.84 (2.77) 6.17 (2.65) 0.33 (1.25) 277
years old Internal migrants 6.02 (2.71) 6.32 (2.74) 0.30 (1.16) 82
External migrants 7.24 (3.41) 7.36 (3.47) 0.12 (0.43) 25
31 years old Non-migrants 3.11 (3.05) 3.53 (3.26) 0.42 (1.23) 680
or above Internal migrants 3.88 (4.17) 4.49 (4.33) 0.61 (1.48) 85
External migrants 4.84 (4.84) 5.31 (4.89) 0.47 (1.65) 19
Note: Individuals are panel respondents who were interviewed in both wave 1 and 5.
Table 3: Reason for Migration by Educational Attainment
Internal migrants External migrants
Mean educational attainment Above Below Above Below
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(1) Economic reason
No job / wanted better job 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06
Business opportunities 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.26
Land not available 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.11
(2) Schooling 0.08 0.00 0.24 0.04
(3) Family related reason
Marriage 0.36 0.37 0.12 0.17
Divorce 0.01 0.03 0.00 -
Widowhood 0.05 0.02 0.04 -
Death of parents 0.00 0.00 - 0.00
Illness of household members 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Other family problems 0.03 0.05 - 0.00
(4) Political reason
Posted to new area 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02
Political / economic problems 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.07
(5) Natural disasters 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.18
No. of migrants 469 453 170 113
Notes: (1) Migrants are panel respondents who were interviewed in both wave 1 and 5. (2) The number is the
proportion relative to the total number of migrants in each category. (3) The mean educational attainment of
non-migrants from wave 1 to 5 is 2.22 years.
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Table 4: Results (DID-OLS)
Dependent variable: Growth of log of per capita consumption (annual) from wave 1 to 5
Education level: Individual Household Individual Household
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Migrants 0.069 0.057 0.011 0.017 - - - -
(0.063) (0.063) (0.071) (0.098)
Internal migrants - - - - 0.050 0.014 -0.008 0.014
(0.068) (0.065) (0.073) (0.098)
External migrants - - - - 0.386*** 0.398*** 0.396*** 0.317*
(0.141) (0.166) (0.138) (0.173)
Migrants
£ Education 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.056*** 0.057** - - - -
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.025)
Internal migrants
£ Education - - - - 0.019** 0.031*** 0.041** 0.043*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.025)
External migrants
£ Education - - - - 0.036* 0.028 0.037 0.043
(0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.034)
Growth from wave 1 to 5
Education -0.001 -0.004 0.041*** 0.046* -0.001 -0.004 0.041*** 0.048*
(years) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.024) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.024)
HH average age 0.011*** 0.008* 0.007*** 0.004 0.011*** 0.008 0.007*** 0.004
(years) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
HH head age -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(years) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
HH size -0.024*** -0.035* -0.027*** -0.042** -0.025*** -0.035* -0.028*** -0.042**
(0.007) (0.018) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.019) (0.007) (0.018)
Proportion of male members 0.597*** 0.385** 0.364*** 0.120 0.561*** 0.323** 0.362*** 0.130
aged 15 to 40 (0.113) (0.159) (0.113) (0.150) (0.112) (0.147) (0.113) (0.151)
Proportion of female members 0.169 -0.017 0.006 -0.204 0.135 -0.028 -0.008 -0.201
aged 15 to 40 (0.177) (0.244) (0.167) (0.224) (0.177) (0.244) (0.167) (0.225)
Constant 0.080 -0.483*** 0.067 -0.427*** 0.092 -0.470*** 0.076 -0.416***
(0.236) (0.085) (0.240) (0.102) (0.234) (0.085) (0.239) (0.103)
Initial village ¯xed e®ects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Initial household ¯xed e®ect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.201 0.621 0.228 0.644 0.216 0.628 0.239 0.649
No. of obs. 3651 3651 3648 3648 3651 3651 3648 3648
Notes: (1) Unit of observations is a person. (2) Sample is panel individuals. (3) Figures ( ) are standard errors. ***
denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (4) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered
residuals within each initial household.
Table 5: Reason for Migration by Destination-gender
Pooling Internal migrants External migrants
Male Female Male Female Male Female
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
(1) Economic reason
No job / wanted better job 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.03
Business opportunities 0.21 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.34 0.10
Land not available 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.03
(2) Schooling 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.14
(3) Family related reason
Marriage 0.03 0.47 0.03 0.52 0.01 0.26
Divorce 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 - 0.02
Widowhood 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01
Death of parents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00
Illness of household members 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Other family problems 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.02 - 0.01
(4) Political reason
Posted to new area 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02
Political / economic problems 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.05
(5) Natural disasters 0.24 0.17 0.25 0.15 0.21 0.28
No. of migrants 626 955 459 770 167 185
Notes: (1) Migrants are panel individuals in wave 5 who migrated at some point between 1991 and 2004. (2) The number
is the proportion relative to the total number of migrants in each destination-gender category.
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Table 6: Appendix: Checking the Correlation between the Pre-migration Level of Schooling and
Wealth in Wave 1 (OLS)
Dependent variables: log of per capita log of per capita log of per capita
non-food consumption cultivated land
consumption (annual) (acre)
(annual)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Education (years)
Individual 0.017*** - 0.022*** - 0.011* -
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
HH average - 0.073*** - 0.093*** - 0.078***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.021)
Age (years) -0.003 0.000 -0.003** 0.000 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age squared 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male dummy 0.016 0.018 0.006 0.009 0.036 0.034
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.022) (0.023)
HH size -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.054*** -0.054***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 10.130*** 9.961*** 10.439*** 10.222*** -0.253 -0.416**
(0.191) (0.201) (0.146) (0.157) (0.172) (0.183)
Village ¯xed e®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.260 0.279 0.291 0.330 0.292 0.314
No. of observations 3689 3689 3689 3689 3583 3583
Notes: (1) Unit of observations is a person. (2) Sample is panel individuals. (3) Figures in ( ) are standard errors.
*** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (4) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered residuals within initial households.
Table 7: Appendix: Migration and Schooling Regressions (OLS)
Dependent variables: Migrants Education
in wave 5 in wave 5
(a) (b)
Age (years) in wave 1 -0.001*** -0.059***
(0.000) (0.003)
Education (years) in wave 1 0.022*** 0.575***
(0.002) (0.014)
Male dummy in wave 1 -0.103*** 0.621***
(0.022) (0.116)
HH head dummy in wave 1 -0.168*** 0.280
(0.030) (0.171)
HH head's spouse dummy in wave 1 -0.205*** -0.031
(0.029) (0.168)
Aged 5 to 15 in wave 1
£ Female dummy 0.157*** 0.439**
(0.031) (0.172)
£ Father's education (years) 0.015*** 0.101***
(0.004) (0.023)
£ Mother's education (years) -0.010** 0.182***
(0.004) (0.027)
£ Rainfall shock in origin 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.365 3.087*
(0.247) (1.776)
Initial household ¯xed e®ects Yes Yes
R-squared 0.453 0.666
No. of obs. 3689 3658
Notes: (1) Unit of observations is a person. (2) Sample is panel individuals. (3) Figures in ( ) are standard errors.
*** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (4) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered residuals within initial households. (5) The rainfall shock is the deviation of the mean rainfall at the
origin between 1986 and 2000 from the average of all sample clusters during the same periods. Monthly rainfall
information between 1980 and 2004, sourced from Tanzania Meteorological Agency, is publicly available from EDI
Ltd. (Economic Development Initiatives) - http://www.edi-africa.com/research/khds/introduction.htm#data.
For each cluster, I exploited rainfall information at either the nearest or (if not available) the 2nd nearest rainfall
station. In the case where the rainfall information is not available for some cluster in some year, it was interpolated
by using the rainfall data in the nearest past or future.
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Table 8: Appendix: Drop Marriage Migrants (DID-OLS)
Dependent variable: Growth of log of per capita consumption (annual) from wave 1 to 5
Education level: Individual Household Individual Household
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Migrants 0.144** 0.113 0.043 0.023 - - - -
(0.073) (0.080) (0.082) (0.117)
Internal migrants - - - - 0.092 0.012 0.001 -0.002
(0.079) (0.085) (0.085) (0.120)
External migrants - - - - 0.521*** 0.560*** 0.431*** 0.362*
(0.136) (0.150) (0.151) (0.194)
Migrants
£ Education 0.027*** 0.038*** 0.052*** 0.058** - - - -
(0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.028)
Internal migrants
£ Education - - - - 0.013 0.033*** 0.036** 0.041
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.029)
External migrants
£ Education - - - - 0.025 0.019 0.036 0.042
(0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.038)
Growth from wave 1 to 5
Education -0.000 -0.004 0.041*** 0.046* -0.000 -0.004 0.041*** 0.049*
(years) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.028) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.028)
HH average age 0.010*** 0.006 0.007*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.006 0.007*** 0.003
(years) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
HH head age -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001
(years) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
HH size -0.027*** -0.036 -0.028*** -0.039* -0.028*** -0.037 -0.028*** -0.039*
(0.007) (0.023) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.023) (0.007) (0.022)
Proportion of male members 0.545*** 0.355** 0.359*** 0.147 0.525*** 0.356** 0.363*** 0.165
aged 15 to 40 (0.113) (0.170) (0.114) (0.160) (0.111) (0.170) (0.113) (0.161)
Proportion of female members 0.104 -0.112 -0.033 -0.269 0.042 -0.139 -0.074 -0.283
aged 15 to 40 (0.195) (0.275) (0.185) (0.254) (0.194) (0.274) (0.184) (0.254)
Constant 0.074 -0.509*** 0.052 -0.454*** 0.074 -0.495*** 0.052 -0.443***
(0.239) (0.096) (0.243) (0.118) (0.235) (0.096) (0.242) (0.118)
Initial village ¯xed e®ects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Initial household ¯xed e®ect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.208 0.645 0.231 0.659 0.225 0.653 0.242 0.664
No. of obs. 3270 3270 3268 3268 3270 3270 3268 3268
Notes: (1) Unit of observations is a person. (2) Sample is panel individuals. (3) Figures ( ) are standard errors.
*** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (4) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered residuals within each initial household.
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Table 9: Appendix: Below 20 in wave 1 (DID-OLS)
Dependent variable: Growth of log of per capita consumption (annual) from wave 1 to 5
Education level: Individual Household Individual Household
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Migrants 0.080 0.079 0.039 0.044 - - - -
(0.074) (0.086) (0.088) (0.140)
Internal migrants - - - - 0.072 0.033 0.020 0.037
(0.078) (0.088) (0.088) (0.139)
External migrants - - - - 0.337* 0.401* 0.419** 0.312
(0.182) (0.217) (0.170) (0.224)
Migrants
£ Education 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.059*** 0.058* - - - -
(0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.035)
Internal migrants
£ Education - - - - 0.024** 0.034*** 0.045** 0.046
(0.010) (0.012) (0.020) (0.035)
External migrants
£ Education - - - - 0.045* 0.027 0.037 0.045
(0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (0.037)
Growth from wave 1 to 5
Education -0.005 -0.000 0.038** 0.045 -0.005 -0.000 0.037** 0.045
(years) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.037) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.037)
HH average age 0.016*** 0.013* 0.009** 0.005 0.015*** 0.013* 0.009*** 0.006
(years) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.017) (0.003) (0.008)
HH head age -0.003** -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003** -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(years) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
HH size -0.020** -0.036* -0.025*** -0.046** -0.021** -0.036 -0.025*** -0.045**
(0.008) (0.021) (0.007) (0.020) (0.008) (0.022) (0.007) (0.021)
Proportion of male members 0.550*** 0.267 0.306** 0.015 0.516*** 0.254 0.310** 0.025
aged 15 to 40 (0.139) (0.234) (0.148) (0.230) (0.140) (0.235) (0.148) (0.232)
Proportion of female members 0.073 -0.178 -0.102 -0.349 0.041 -0.183 -0.114 -0.343
aged 15 to 40 (0.228) (0.354) (0.224) (0.340) (0.228) (0.355) (0.224) (0.341)
Constant 0.071 -0.380*** 0.066 -0.213 0.088 -0.359*** 0.075 -0.188
(0.228) (0.104) (0.226) (0.151) (0.224) (0.105) (0.224) (0.154)
Initial village ¯xed e®ects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Initial household ¯xed e®ect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.207 0.621 0.233 0.643 0.221 0.627 0.243 0.647
No. of obs. 2423 2423 2421 2421 2423 2423 2421 2421
Notes: (1) Unit of observations is a person. (2) Sample is panel individuals. (3) Figures ( ) are standard errors.
*** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (4) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered residuals within each initial household.
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Table 10: Appendix: Impact Evaluation Approach - Recovering Beegle et al. (2011) (Not for
Publication)
Dependent variable: Growth of log of per capita
consumption (annual)
from wave 1 to 5
OLS 2SLS OLS
(a) (b) (c)
Migrants 0.335*** 0.340*** -
(0.043) (0.109)
Internal migrants - - 0.237***
(0.042)
External migrants - - 0.659***
(0.083)
Individual characteristics at baseline (wave 1)
Age (years) 0.003 0.003* 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (years) 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Male dummy 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.082***
(0.030) (0.026) (0.030)
Constant -0.497*** -0.499*** -0.463***
(0.044) (0.053) (0.044)
Initial household ¯xed e®ects Yes Yes Yes
T-test (p-value) 0.571 0.857 -
Joint signi¯cance of instruments in the ¯rst stage
F-statistic - 38.48 -
p-values - 0.000 -
Sargan test (p-values) - 0.198 -
R-squared 0.591 0.591 0.600
No. of obs. 3682 3682 3682
Notes: (1) Unit of observations is a person. (2) Sample is panel individuals. (3) Figures ( ) are standard errors.
*** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (4) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered residuals within initial households. (5) T-test is the test for the null hypothesis that a coe±cient
on migrants is equal to the migration e®ect estimated in Beegle et al. (2011), 0.36. (6) Column (b) instruments
migrants by using a similar set of excluded instruments exploited in Beegle et al. (2011): a dummy for a household
head in wave 1; a dummy for a household head's spouse in wave 1; a dummy for females aged 5 to 15 years in wave
1; and a dummy for those who were aged 5 to 15 years in wave 1 and lived in a village which experienced the rainfall
shock (see notes in Appendix Table 7 for precise explanation of the rainfall shock).
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Table 11: Appendix: Correlation between Income and Consumption (OLS) (Not for Publication)
Dependent variable: Log of household consumption (annual)
Wave 1 to 4 Wave 5
Non- Internal External Non- Internal External
migrants migrants migrants migrants migrants migrants
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Log of household income 0.589*** 0.543*** 0.500*** 0.449*** 0.249*** -0.026
(weekly) (0.020) (0.025) (0.040) (0.032) (0.028) (0.030)
Remittances received in the past 0.058* 0.067** 0.102 0.105* -0.091** 0.211
6 months (dummy, one if exist) (0.035) (0.029) (0.072) (0.057) (0.042) (0.137)
Non-labor income in the past 0.123*** 0.072*** 0.134*** 0.119*** 0.118* 0.229
6 months (dummy, one if exist) (0.028) (0.022) (0.045) (0.037) (0.065) (0.164)
Constant 7.190*** 8.070*** 8.166*** 8.251*** 9.861*** 12.538***
(0.159) (0.225) (0.328) (0.268) (0.207) (0.231)
District ¯xed e®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Time (wave) ¯xed e®ects Yes Yes Yes - - -
R-squared 0.631 0.637 0.545 0.499 0.285 0.022
No. of obs. 1258 1803 607 1312 986 182
Notes: (1) Unit of observations is a household-wave. (2) Figures in ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signi¯cance
at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (3) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within
current households. (4) Households are de¯ned as migrants in wave 1 to 4 if they supply at least one member who
moved out of original community between 1991 and 2004 and in wave 5 if they contain at least one panel migrant
in them. (5) Remittances take the form of either gift or loan. (6) Non-labor income contains income from pension
or retirement funds, insurances, interest, lottery winnings, dowry, inheritance, sale of durable goods, sale of house
or land, and so on. (7) Except for columns (e) and (f), district is classi¯ed into 6 categories: Biharamulo, Bukoba
Rural, Bukoba Urban, Muleba, Ngara, and Karagwe.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Migrants by Year of Migration
Notes: (1) Migrants are panel individuals in wave 5 who migrated at some point between 1991 and 2004. (2) The
proportion is relative to the total number of migrants in each destination category.
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Figure 2: Transtion of Activity Shares in Total Hours Worked
Note: Activity shares are the proportion of weekly hours worked of each activity relative to the total weekly hours
worked.
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Figure 3: Appendix: Optimal Choice of Migrants
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